gpt-4.1
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
61.7%
(116 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
2.74
per question
Avg. Execution Time
6.93s
Total Cost
$5.3568
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | 8.8.8.8 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "ping"
| extend ping_target = extract(@"ping\s+(-[\w\s]+\s+)?([\d\.]+)", 2, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ping_target)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ping_target | |
| 2 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | bash -c 'if [ "$(uname)" = 'FreeBSD' ]; then service -e; else systemctl --type=service; fi;' | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == 'ProcessCreated'
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('systemctl list-units', 'systemctl --type=service', 'service --status-all', 'initctl list', 'rc-status', 'chkconfig --list')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, FileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 3 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | /tmp/T1003.007.bin | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName == "dd" or ProcessCommandLine has "dd "
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"if=/proc/\d+/mem"
| extend outputFile = extract(@"of=([^\s]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, outputFile
| where isnotempty(outputFile) | |
| 4 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | Format-Hex | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "\\.\\" and (ProcessCommandLine has "PhysicalDrive" or ProcessCommandLine has ":")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("format-hex", "[byte]", "get-content", "-encoding byte", "convertto-hex")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 5 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | svchost-exe.dmp | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == 'FileCreated'
| extend fileNameLower = tolower(FileName),
folderPathLower = tolower(FolderPath),
procFileNameLower = tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName),
procCmdLineLower = tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where procFileNameLower == 'rundll32.exe'
| where procCmdLineLower has 'comsvcs.dll' and procCmdLineLower has 'svchost'
| where folderPathLower has_any('\\temp', '/temp', '\temp', 'temp')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 6 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "netsh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("wlan", "show", "profile") and ProcessCommandLine has "key=clear"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 7 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "cmdkey.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/list"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 8 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | Out-Minidump.ps1 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where tolower(FileName) in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has_any ("lsass", "procdump", "minidump", "out-minidump", "sekurlsa")
| extend ScriptFile = extract(@"([\w\-\\.:]+\.ps1)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ScriptFile)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, ScriptFile
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 9 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | netstat | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ('netstat', 'ss', 'lsof')
or ProcessCommandLine contains "netstat"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "ss "
or ProcessCommandLine contains "lsof -i"
| summarize count() by FileName, ProcessCommandLine, DeviceName, AccountName, TimeGenerated
| sort by count_ desc, TimeGenerated desc | |
| 10 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | New-Object | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FileName in~ ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe'))
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('Test-NetConnection', 'System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient', 'Test-Connection', 'Invoke-Expression', 'New-Object') and ProcessCommandLine has '445'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 11 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | ip | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "metrics" and ProcessCommandLine contains "tcp"
| where not(ProcessCommandLine contains "lo")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 12 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 13 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | arp -a | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (tolower(FileName) has "arp" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has "arp")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"arp(.exe)?\s+(-a|-g)"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 14 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" or FileName =~ "pwsh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc ", "-encodedcommand ")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName, AccountDomain
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 15 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where strlen(ProcessCommandLine) > 300
or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}"
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Invoke", "Reflection", "Decode", "exec", "forEach", "Base64", "FromBase64String")
or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"[\^%$\+#\{\}\[\];\|]{8,}"
| summarize Count = count() by FileName, DeviceName
| top 20 by Count desc | |
| 16 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | /tmp/art.sh | ✓ | // Step 1: Find commands that decode base64 to an output file
let decoded_scripts = DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "base64" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-d", ">", ">>")
| extend script_file = extract(@"> *([/\w\d_.-]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(script_file)
| project DeviceId, script_file, decoded_time=ProcessCreationTime;
// Step 2: Look for executions of that script file on the same device soon after
DeviceProcessEvents
| join kind=inner (decoded_scripts) on DeviceId
| where (FileName == script_file or ProcessCommandLine has script_file)
| where ProcessCreationTime > decoded_time and ProcessCreationTime < decoded_time + 1h
| summarize FirstExecutionTime=min(ProcessCreationTime) by DeviceName, script_file, FileName
| project DeviceName, GeneratedAndExecutedScript=script_file, FileName_Executed=FileName, FirstExecutionTime | |
| 17 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | cron | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "cron"
| where FolderPath !in ("/usr/sbin", "/usr/bin")
// Optionally: add more standard cron paths as needed
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, SHA256
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 18 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 19 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | sc.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d) // Adjust as needed for your investigation window
| where FileName in~ ("sc.exe", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "reg.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("create", "config", "service")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)w?32?time"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 21 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | taskhostw.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoInternalFileName =~ "powershell.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "powershell.exe")
// Exclude standard System32 path
| where tolower(FolderPath) has "appdata" and not(tolower(FolderPath) has "windows\\system32")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription, ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 22 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | "cmd.exe" /c for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(FileName) == "cmd.exe" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) == "cmd.exe"
| where (
(tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has "for" and tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has "ping" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"for.+(%%?\w).+ping")
or
(tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) has "for" and tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) has "ping" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine matches regex @"for.+(%%?\w).+ping")
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 23 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | Easter_egg | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("cookie", "egg", "cheese", "bacon", "peach", "apple", "onion")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath | |
| 24 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | NETSTAT.EXE | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "netstat.exe" or FileName =~ "netstat"
| extend Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Parent, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 25 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | "powershell.exe" & {copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password"} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(FileName) in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "C$" and ProcessCommandLine has "\\" and ProcessCommandLine has "$"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "temp" or ProcessCommandLine contains "%temp%" or ProcessCommandLine contains "appdata\\local\\temp"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 26 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | persistevil | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath startswith "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileCreated (CreateFile)", "FileWritten", "FileCreatedOrWritten")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName | |
| 27 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | Get-NetTCPConnection | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-NetTCPConnection", "netstat", "Get-NetTCPConn")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| extend ExecutedCmdlet = case(ProcessCommandLine has "Get-NetTCPConnection", "Get-NetTCPConnection", ProcessCommandLine has "Get-NetTCPConn", "Get-NetTCPConn", ProcessCommandLine has "netstat", "netstat", "Unknown") | |
| 28 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 29 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | rclone.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "powershell.exe" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "powershell"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ftp", "put", "ftp:")
| where FileName !~ "powershell.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ParentProcess=InitiatingProcessFileName, ParentCommand=InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ExfilExecutable=FileName, ExfilCommand=ProcessCommandLine
| summarize ExfilCount=count() by ExfilExecutable, ExfilCommand
| sort by ExfilCount desc | |
| 30 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| summarize count() by FileName | |
| 31 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1053.005\src\T1053_005_WMI.xml | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "RegisterByXml" or ProcessCommandLine has "RegisterTaskDefinition" or ProcessCommandLine has "RegisterTask"
| where ProcessCommandLine has ".xml"
| extend XMLFileName = extract(@"([\w\d:\\/_\-\.]+\.xml)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(XMLFileName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, XMLFileName | |
| 32 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 33 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | Get-Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe')
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-Process", "gps", "ps ")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 34 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | art-timer.timer | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in ("systemctl", "systemd")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("start", "enable") and ProcessCommandLine has ".timer"
| extend TimerUnit = extract(@"([\w-]+\.timer)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(TimerUnit)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ActionType, ProcessCommandLine, TimerUnit
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 35 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 36 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | Win32_Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject", "Get-CimInstance", "wmic")
| extend WMIClass = extract(@'(?i)(Win32_[a-zA-Z0-9_]+)', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(WMIClass)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, WMIClass
| summarize count() by WMIClass | |
| 37 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | c:\windows\System32\calc.exe | ✓ | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where tolower(RegistryKey) has "mscfile\\shell\\open\\command"
| where (tolower(RegistryKey) startswith "hkey_current_user" or tolower(RegistryKey) startswith "hkcu")
| where ActionType =~ "RegistryValueSet"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 38 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | "cmd.exe" /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "taskmgr.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any("/", "-") and not(ProcessCommandLine has_any("/1", "/2", "/3", "/4", "/5", "/6"))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName | |
| 39 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | powershell.exe | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (tolower(FileName) == "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("process", "list"))
or (tolower(FileName) == "powershell.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine has "Get-WmiObject" or ProcessCommandLine has "Get-CimInstance") and ProcessCommandLine has "Win32_Process")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 40 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 41 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 42 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 43 | Which full interactive shell command, as recorded in the Linux process logs, repeatedly echoed a distinctive marker message to the terminal? | for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done | bash -c 'cp $HISTFILE $HISTFILE.OLD; if ((${#HISTFILE[@]})); then echo $HISTFILE; fi; echo "" > $HISTFILE; if [ $(wc -c <$HISTFILE) -gt 1 ]; then echo "$HISTFILE is larger than 1k"; fi; ls -la $HISTFILE ; cat $HISTFILE; history -c ; if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo "History cache cleared"; fi' | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "ksh")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "echo"
| extend marker=extract("echo ([\"']?[^\"' ]+[\"']?)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(marker)
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Devices=make_set(DeviceName) by ProcessCommandLine, marker
| where Count > 1
| order by Count desc, LastSeen desc
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, Devices, ProcessCommandLine, marker, Count | |
| 44 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | cat /etc/shells | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/shells"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 45 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where
FileName =~ "tasklist.exe"
or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("process list", "process get"))
or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "Get-Process")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| summarize Count=count(), SampleCommand=any(ProcessCommandLine) by FileName
| order by Count desc | |
| 46 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | dash | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ('cpan', 'cpanm', 'cpanp') or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ('cpan', 'cpanm', 'cpanp')
| where FileName has_any ('sh', 'bash', 'dash', 'zsh', 'ksh')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath | |
| 47 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | chsh -s /bin/sh art | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("chsh", "usermod", "sed", "tee", "echo")
or (ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/passwd" and (ProcessCommandLine has ">" or ProcessCommandLine has "tee" or ProcessCommandLine has "sed" or ProcessCommandLine has "usermod" or ProcessCommandLine has "chsh" or ProcessCommandLine has "echo"))
| where (ProcessCommandLine has "-s" or ProcessCommandLine has "shell" or ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/passwd")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 48 | Review recent Windows process event logs for PowerShell activity that suggests local group enumeration through WMI. What exact command was executed? | Get-WMIObject Win32_Group | "powershell.exe" & {Get-WMIObject Win32_Group} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "powershell")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject Win32_Group", "gwmi win32_group", "wmic group", "Get-CimInstance Win32_Group", "Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Group")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 49 | On a Linux endpoint, process events reveal a chain of group‐enumeration utilities executed by a single session. Which utility was used to query the system’s group database? | getent | getent | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("getent", "cat", "groups", "id")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("group", "/etc/group")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessSessionId
| summarize UtilitiesUsed=make_set(FileName) by InitiatingProcessSessionId, DeviceName, AccountName | |
| 50 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | N/A | ✗ |
Page 1 of 4