gpt-4.1-finetuned
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
26.1%
(49 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
4.22
per question
Avg. Execution Time
9.90s
Total Cost
$7.7796
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "cmdkey.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "list"
| summarize ProcessCommandLineSet = makeset(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId, DeviceName
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.') [0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
| project-away DeviceName, DeviceId
| extend HostName = tolower(HostName)
| extend DnsDomain = tolower(DnsDomain)
| |
| 2 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | /tmp/T1003.007.bin | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("dd", "dd.exe")
// Look for command with the input file i.e. if=/proc/PID/mem
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("if=/proc", "/mem")
// Project the output file after the 'of=' syntax in the command
| extend DumpWrittenOnHostFile = trim(@"'", tostring(extract(@"of=([\w-\.:/\\]*?) ",1,ProcessCommandLine )))
| where isnotempty(DumpWrittenOnHostFile)
| summarize any(*) by DumpWrittenOnHostFile
| order by tostring(DumpWrittenOnHostFile) asc
| take 50
// Project only the output file name in the memory dump file
| project DumpWrittenOnHostFile //, *
// Uncomment to show results and files dropped by each host
// | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.') [0]), DnsDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
| |
| 3 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | C:\Users\wipro\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost-exe.dmp | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath contains "Temp" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "comsvcs.dll"
| extend DumpFile = FolderPath
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) by DumpFile, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceName
| order by LastSeen desc
| extend TimeGenerated = LastSeen | |
| 4 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 5 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 6 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 7 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | 8.8.8.8 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine startswith "ping"
| project ProcessCommandLine
| extend IPAddress = extract(@"\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+", 0, ProcessCommandLine)
| project IPAddress
| where isnotempty(IPAddress)
| distinct IPAddress
| |
| 8 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 9 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "Show" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "clear" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceName
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 10 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 11 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 12 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 13 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 14 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("powershell", "enable-psremoting")
| project Timestamp, ProcessCommandLine, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc | |
| 15 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex ".* -e.*([A-Za-z0-9+/=]){10,}.*"
| summarize count() by InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| sort by count_ desc | |
| 16 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 17 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 18 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | /tmp/art.sh | ✓ | // Identify base64 decoding processes with output redirected to a .sh file
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "base64 -d"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine matches regex "> .+\\.sh"
| project ParentCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ParentProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ParentProcessId = ProcessId, DeviceId, DeviceName, TimeGenerated, AccountName, AccountDomain, AccountSid
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine matches regex " sh "
| project ChildProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ChildCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, AccountDomain, ProcessId, TimeGenerated
) on DeviceId, DeviceName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, AccountDomain, ParentProcessName, ParentCommandLine, ChildProcessName, ChildCommandLine, ScriptName = tostring(split(ChildCommandLine, ' ')[-1])
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| extend Tactic = "Execution", Technique = "Linux Bash Script Execution", TechniqueID = "T1059.004"
| summarize FirstTimeDecoded = min(TimeGenerated), EventCount = count() by DeviceName, AccountName, AccountDomain, ParentProcessName, ParentCommandLine, ChildProcessName, ChildCommandLine, ScriptName, Tactic, Technique, TechniqueID
| sort by FirstTimeDecoded desc | |
| 19 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 21 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 22 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | "powershell.exe" & {Remove-Item -Path \"\"\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\temp\\Easter_Bunny.password\"\"\nRemove-Item -Path \"\"$Env:TEMP\\Easter_egg.password\"\"} | ✗ | let tempPath = "\\TEMP\\";
let cshare = "$";
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has tempPath and ProcessCommandLine has cshare
| summarize count(), make_list(ProcessCommandLine)
| order by count_ desc
| extend Full_PowerShell_Command = list_ProcessCommandLine[0]
| project-away count_, list_ProcessCommandLine | |
| 23 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 24 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 25 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 26 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 27 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 28 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 29 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 30 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | persistevil | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where (ActionType =~ "FileCreated" or ActionType =~ "FileModified")
| where FolderPath contains "/var/spool/cron/crontabs/"
| project-reorder Timestamp, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, MD5, SHA256
| extend timestamp = Timestamp, FileNameArray = split(FolderPath, "/")
| extend FileName = tostring(FileNameArray[4])
| project-rename MDTimestamp = Timestamp, MDEventTime = timestamp, MDDeviceName = DeviceName, MDFolderPath = FolderPath, MDProcessName = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, MDParentProcessName = InitiatingProcessParentFileName, MDMD5 = MD5, MDOwner = InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend NTDomain = iff(MDOwner contains "@", tostring(split(MDOwner, "@", 1)[0]), MDOwner)
| extend NTDomain = iff(MDOwner contains "\\", tostring(split(MDOwner, "\\", 1)[0]), NTDomain)
| extend Name = iff(MDOwner contains "@", tostring(split(MDOwner, "@", 0)[0]), MDOwner)
| extend Name = iff(MDOwner contains "\\", tostring(split(MDOwner, "@", 0)[1]), Name)
| project MDTimestamp, MDEventTime, MDDeviceName, FileName, MDFolderPath, MDProcessName, MDParentProcessName, MDMD5, SHA256, NTDomain ,Name
| extend OSPlatform = "Linux"
| distinct MDTimestamp , MDEventTime, MDDeviceName, OSPlatform, FileName, MDFolderPath, MDProcessName, MDMD5, SHA256, NTDomain, Name, MDParentProcessName
| project MDTimestamp, MDEventTime, MDDeviceName, OSPlatform, FileName, MDFolderPath, MDProcessName, MDMD5, SHA256, NTDomain, Name, MDParentProcessName
| extend timestamp = MDTimestamp, Name = tostring(split(Name, "@", 0)[0])
| extend Account_0_Name = Name
| extend Account_0_NTDomain = NTDomain
| extend Host_0_HostName = MDDeviceName
| extend Host_0_OSType = OSPlatform
| extend File_0_Name = FileName
| extend File_0_Directory = MDFolderPath
| extend Process_0_ProcessId = MDProcessName
| extend FileHash_0_Algorithm = "MD5"
| extend FileHash_0_Value = MDMD5
| extend FileHash_1_Algorithm = "SHA256"
| extend FileHash_1_Value = SHA256
| extend Process_1_ProcessId = MDParentProcessName
| |
| 31 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | None | ✗ | let CmdStart = DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| summarize arg_min(Timestamp, *) by InitiatingProcessAccountSid, DeviceName, FileName;
let BuiltinTools = dynamic([
"netstat.exe",
"net.exe",
"tasklist.exe"
]);
let OriginalTool = DeviceProcessEvents
| join kind=inner
(
CmdStart
)
on $left.DeviceName == $right.DeviceName, $left.InitiatingProcessAccountSid == $right.InitiatingProcessAccountSid
| where FileName in (BuiltinTools)
| summarize arg_min(Timestamp, *) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, FileName;
OriginalTool
| extend ToConsole = iif(isnotempty(ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription), 1, 0)
| extend Filename = iif(ToConsole == 1, "N/A", tostring(split(ProcessCommandLine, ">", 1)[1]))
| project-reorder DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, FileName, ToConsole, Filename
| sort by DeviceName desc, InitiatingProcessAccountSid
// The query outputs details about the tool found in the cmd.exe process tree, whether output went to the console or file, and the associated machine/user details.
| |
| 32 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 33 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 35 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 36 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 37 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 38 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 39 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 40 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | cmd.exe /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("cmd.exe", "/")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "taskmgr"
| extend weird_flag = iff(ProcessCommandLine has "@echo off", "false", "true")
| summarize by AccountName, AccountSid, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Cmd = ProcessCommandLine, weird_flag
| order by Cmd asc nulls last | |
| 41 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 42 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 43 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 44 | Which full interactive shell command, as recorded in the Linux process logs, repeatedly echoed a distinctive marker message to the terminal? | for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 45 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | /bin/sh | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains ".sh"
| summarize processCommandLineCount=count() by InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DeviceName, AccountName
| extend timestamp = now()
| sort by processCommandLineCount desc
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(AccountName, "@")[0]), DnsDomain = tostring(split(AccountName, "@")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, "."))
| extend DNSDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
// Please uncomment below to filter the results based on a specific domain/hostname
// | where DNSDomain in ("<your domain/host to be filtered>") or HostName in ("<your domain/host to be filtered>")
// Please uncomment below to filter the results based on a specific account name
// | where AccountName in ("<your account to be filtered>")
| |
| 46 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 47 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | cat /etc/shells | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where AccountDomain != ""
| where AccountName != ""
//Detect direct `/bin/sh /etc/shells` and similar, or indirect `/etc/shells |awk -F: '/bin/{print $1}'` and similar
| where (ProcessCommandLine in~ ("cat /etc/shells", "more /etc/shells", "less /etc/shells", "tail /etc/shells", "head /etc/shells", "awk -F: '/bin/{print $1}' /etc/shells", "/etc/shells |awk -F: '/bin/{print $1}'", "/etc/shells |awk -F:' '{print $1}'", "/bin/{print ", "|awk -F: '/bin/'") and ProcessCommandLine contains "/etc/shells")
or (ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/shells" and InitiatingProcessFileName == "/bin/sh" )
//Raise if OS identified as Linux.
| summarize count() by bin(TimeGenerated, 1h), AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountSid, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessCommandLine,ProcessId, Type, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| extend timestamp = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| extend Account_0_Name = AccountName
| extend Account_0_Sid = InitiatingProcessAccountSid
| extend Host_0_HostName = DeviceName
| extend Process_0_ProcessId = ProcessId
| extend Process_0_CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend Process_1_ProcessId = InitiatingProcessId
| extend Process_1_ProcessId = ProcessId
| extend Process_1_CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
| extend Process_0_FileName = InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| extend Type = strcat(Type, "_" , InitiatingProcessParentFileName) | |
| 48 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | The process invocation that altered a user's login shell is: chsh -s /bin/sh art. The full command used was 'chsh -s /bin/sh art'. Additional invocations are present such as useradd with the --shell option, usermod for lock/unlock/expire date, and a combined bash command performing multiple modifications. | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "chsh" or ProcessCommandLine contains "usermod"
| summarize by AccountName, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
| project AccountName, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, Explanation = strcat("Account ", AccountName, " had shell modified via: ", ProcessCommandLine, " on device: ", DeviceName)
| limit 100 | |
| 49 | On a Linux system, find any process creation record where awk is used with a BEGIN rule to launch a shell. What was the exact command invoked? | awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}’ | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 50 | During a Linux investigation, you notice processes spawning curl and wget commands that pull a script from a remote GitHub raw URL and pipe it into bash. Identify the name of the script that was retrieved and executed. | echo-art-fish.sh | N/A | ✗ |
Page 1 of 4