gpt-5-nano-high
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
30.3%
(57 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
3.82
per question
Avg. Execution Time
23.40s
Total Cost
$1.2952
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | ip | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("tcp","netstat","ss","tcp_metric","tcp-metrics","gettcpmetrics","metrics","cache")
| where not (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "127.0.0.1" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "localhost" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "lo")
| extend Utility = strcat(InitiatingProcessFileName, ": ", InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Hits = count() by InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Utility
| sort by Hits desc
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, Hits, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Utility | |
| 2 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | "cmd.exe" /c for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) == "cmd.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "ping" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "for /l"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 5 | |
| 3 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | svchost-exe.dmp | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "rundll32.exe" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "rundll32.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "COMSVCS.DLL" or InitiatingProcessFileName contains "COMSVCS.DLL"
| where ActionType in ("CreateFile","FileCreated")
| extend FileNameLower = tolower(FileName), FolderPathLower = tolower(FolderPath)
| where FileNameLower endswith ".dmp" and FolderPathLower contains "temp"
| extend FullPath = strcat(FolderPath, FileName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, FullPath, FileSize, ReportId | |
| 4 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | "cmd.exe" /c netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | let StartTime = ago(24h);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (StartTime .. now())
| extend CmdLine = coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| where CmdLine has "netsh" and CmdLine has "wlan"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSessionId, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, CmdLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 5 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | sh -c "systemctl status himdsd 1>/dev/null 2>&1" | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (
InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs "systemctl" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs "service" or
ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "systemctl" or ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "service" or
InitiatingProcessFileName contains_cs "systemctl" or InitiatingProcessFileName contains_cs "service" or
FileName contains_cs "systemctl" or FileName contains_cs "service"
)
| where (
InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs "list-units" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs "list-unit-files" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs "--status-all" or
ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "list-units" or ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "list-unit-files" or ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "--status-all" or
InitiatingProcessFileName contains_cs "systemctl" or FileName contains_cs "systemctl"
)
| extend FullCommand = coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FullCommand
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 6 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-EncodedCommand"
| extend LauncherExecutable = InitiatingProcessFileName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LauncherExecutable, LauncherCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, EncodedProcess = FileName, EncodedCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
| summarize Launches = count() by LauncherExecutable, LauncherCommandLine, EncodedProcess, EncodedCommandLine
| order by Launches desc | |
| 7 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | 8.8.8.8 | ✓ | let TimeWindow = 7d;
let LinuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform contains "Linux"
| distinct DeviceId;
let PingProcs = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(TimeWindow)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName endswith "ping" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "ping"
| where DeviceId in (LinuxDevices)
| extend CmdLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend TargetArg = extract(@"ping\\s+(?:-c\\s+\\d+\\s+)?([^\\s]+)", 1, CmdLine)
| project DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, CmdLine, TargetArg, TimeGenerated;
let PingNet = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(TimeWindow)
| where InitiatingProcessId in (PingProcs | distinct InitiatingProcessId)
| summarize RemoteIP = any(RemoteIP) by InitiatingProcessId;
PingProcs
| join kind=leftouter (PingNet) on InitiatingProcessId
| project DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, CmdLine, TargetArg, RemoteIP | |
| 8 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | arp -a | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName endswith "arp.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName endswith "arp" or FileName endswith "arp.exe" or FileName endswith "arp")
| extend ExactCommand = coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| where ExactCommand contains "arp" and (ExactCommand contains "-a" or ExactCommand contains "-g")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, ExactCommand
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 9 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | ss | ✗ | let StartTime = ago(1d);
let EndTime = now();
let procEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (StartTime .. EndTime)
| extend cmd = tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine), fname = tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName)
| extend Utility = iif(fname in ("netstat","ss","lsof"), fname,
iif(cmd contains "netstat", "netstat",
iif(cmd contains "ss", "ss",
iif(cmd contains "lsof", "lsof", "Unknown"))))
| where Utility != "Unknown";
let netEvents = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (StartTime .. EndTime)
| extend cmd = tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine), fname = tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName)
| extend Utility = iif(fname in ("netstat","ss","lsof"), fname,
iif(cmd contains "netstat", "netstat",
iif(cmd contains "ss", "ss",
iif(cmd contains "lsof", "lsof", "Unknown"))))
| where Utility != "Unknown";
(procEvents
| union (netEvents)
)
| summarize Count = count() by Utility
| sort by Count desc
| take 1
| project Utility, Count | |
| 10 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | svchost.exe | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath contains "AppData" and not (FolderPath contains "System32")) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "AppData" and not (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "System32"))
| where (FileName contains "powershell" or InitiatingProcessFileName contains "powershell" or ProcessCommandLine contains "powershell" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "powershell")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine
| distinct DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath | |
| 11 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | /tmp/T1003.007.bin | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| extend CommandLine = coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| where TimeGenerated between (ago(1d) .. now())
| where tolower(CommandLine) contains "dd" and tolower(CommandLine) contains "/proc/" and tolower(CommandLine) contains "/mem"
| extend OutputFile = extract(@"(?i)of=([^\s]+)", 1, CommandLine)
| where isnotempty(OutputFile)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId, CommandLine, OutputFile
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 12 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | let credMgrInvocations = (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where (isnotempty(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) or isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine))
| extend CmdLine = tostring(coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, ""))
| extend CmdLower = tolower(CmdLine)
| where (CmdLower contains "rundll32.exe" and CmdLower contains "keymgr.dll" and CmdLower contains "krshowkeymgr")
or (CmdLower contains "cmdkey.exe" and CmdLower contains "/list")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, CmdLine
);
credMgrInvocations
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 13 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 14 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 15 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 16 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | /tmp/crond/crond | ✓ | let TimeRange = 14d;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCreationTime >= ago(TimeRange)
| where (tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "cron" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "cron" or tolower(FileName) contains "cron" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) contains "cron")
| extend InitiatingPath = strcat(InitiatingProcessFolderPath, "/", InitiatingProcessFileName)
| join kind=leftouter (
DeviceFileEvents
| project InitiatingProcessId, FileName, FolderPath, PreviousFileName, PreviousFolderPath
) on InitiatingProcessId
| project TimeGenerated = InitiatingProcessCreationTime, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingPath, FileName, FolderPath, PreviousFileName, PreviousFolderPath
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 200 | |
| 17 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 18 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | svchost.exe | ✗ | let CopyEvents = DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ('FileCopied','FileCreated')
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains 'System32'
| where FolderPath contains 'C:\\Users\\'
| extend CopiedTime = TimeGenerated, CopiedFileName = FileName, CopiedToFolder = FolderPath, CopyingProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, CopiedSource = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| project CopiedTime, CopiedFileName, CopiedToFolder, CopyingProcess, CopiedSource;
let RunEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(24h)
| extend RunTime = TimeGenerated, RunFileName = FileName, RunFolder = FolderPath
| project RunTime, RunFileName, RunFolder;
CopyEvents
| join kind=inner (RunEvents) on $left.CopiedFileName == $right.RunFileName
| where RunTime >= CopiedTime
| where RunFolder == CopiedToFolder
| summarize FirstRun=min(RunTime) by CopiedFileName, CopiedTime, CopiedToFolder, CopyingProcess, CopiedSource
| project CopiedFileName, DestinationFolder = CopiedToFolder, CopyingProcess, SourceProcessFolder = CopiedSource, CopyTime = CopiedTime, FirstRun | |
| 19 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 21 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | orange | ✗ | let startTime = ago(1d);
let endTime = now();
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (startTime .. endTime)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName endswith ".exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("nmap","masscan","nikto","sqlmap","hydra","dnsrecon","theharvester","whois","curl","wget","nc","netcat","powershell","wmic","certutil")
| extend CmdLine = tostring(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| extend FunctionName = case(
CmdLine contains "-O", "apple",
CmdLine contains "-sS", "banana",
CmdLine contains "-sV", "cookie",
CmdLine contains "-sU", "donut",
CmdLine contains "-A", "orange",
CmdLine contains "-sC", "peach",
"Unknown")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, CmdLine, FunctionName
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by DeviceId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 22 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 23 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks" or FileName contains "schtasks.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName contains "schtasks.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, FileName
| summarize Count = count() by InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| where Count > 0
| order by Count desc
| |
| 24 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 25 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 26 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 27 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 28 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | NETSTAT.EXE | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains_cs "cmd.exe"
| where (FileName contains_cs "netstat" or ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "netstat" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs "netstat")
| extend Tool = FileName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Tool
| distinct TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Tool | |
| 29 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 30 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | Get-Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains 'powershell' or tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains 'powershell.exe'
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs 'Get-Process'
| extend Cmdlet = iff(InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains_cs 'Get-Process', 'Get-Process', '')
| where Cmdlet != ''
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Cmdlet | |
| 31 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 32 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 33 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | "cmd.exe" /c taskmgr.exe /7 taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(FileName) contains "taskmgr.exe" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "taskmgr.exe"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "cmd.exe" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "cmd"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/" // presence of a slash-delimited flag indicates an unusual flag
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessSessionId
| extend FullCommandExecuted = strcat(coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ""), " ", coalesce(ProcessCommandLine, ""))
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 35 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) == 'cmd.exe'
| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) and tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains 'tasklist'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, ReportId, _ResourceId | |
| 36 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 37 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 38 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 39 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 40 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 41 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 42 | During a Linux investigation, you notice processes spawning curl and wget commands that pull a script from a remote GitHub raw URL and pipe it into bash. Identify the name of the script that was retrieved and executed. | echo-art-fish.sh | echo-art-fish.sh | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "curl" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "wget"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "raw.githubusercontent.com" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "githubusercontent.com"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "| bash" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "| /bin/bash" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "| /bin/sh"
| extend ScriptUrl = extract("https?://[^ ]+", 0, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| extend ScriptName = extract("https?://[^/]+/.*/([^/?#]+)(?:[?#].*)?$", 1, ScriptUrl)
| where isnotempty(ScriptName)
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), DeviceCount = dcount(DeviceId), Hits = count() by ScriptName, ScriptUrl
| order by Hits desc | |
| 43 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 44 | Which full interactive shell command, as recorded in the Linux process logs, repeatedly echoed a distinctive marker message to the terminal? | for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 45 | Review recent Windows process event logs for PowerShell activity that suggests local group enumeration through WMI. What exact command was executed? | Get-WMIObject Win32_Group | Get-WMIObject Win32_Group | ✓ | let Lookback = 1d;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
| where (tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "powershell" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "powershell" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "powershell")
| where (tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "get-wmiobject" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "gwmi" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "get-ciminstance" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "get-wmiobject" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "gwmi" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "get-ciminstance")
| where (tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "win32_group" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "win32_groupuser" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "win32_group" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "win32_groupuser")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId | |
| 46 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 47 | On a Linux system, review process execution records for any shell process that set an environment variable containing executable code and then piped it into another shell instance. Determine which environment variable name was used to store the script content. | ART | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 48 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | cpan | ✓ | let startTime = ago(1d);
let endTime = now();
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (startTime .. endTime)
| where (tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "perl" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "perl" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "cpan" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "cpan" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "cpanm" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "cpanm")
| where (tolower(FileName) contains "sh" or tolower(FileName) contains "bash" or tolower(FileName) contains "zsh" or tolower(FileName) contains "dash" or tolower(FileName) contains "ash")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ShellFileName = FileName, ShellFolderPath = FolderPath, ShellCmdLine = ProcessCommandLine, ShellPid = ProcessId, ShellCreationTime = ProcessCreationTime, ToolName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ToolCmdLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ToolProcessId = InitiatingProcessId, ParentCreated = InitiatingProcessCreationTime
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 49 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 50 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | N/A | ✗ |
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