gpt-5-nano-medium
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
23.8%
(44 / 185 successful)
Average Attempts
4.03
per question
Avg. Execution Time
20.05s
Total Cost
$1.2855
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 185 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | powershell.exe | ✓ | let suspiciousPS = tolower("powershell");
DeviceProcessEvents
| where isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "powershell" and (
tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "encodedcommand" or
tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "base64" or
tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "iex" or
tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "invoke-expression"
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ExecutedProcessName = FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, PayloadCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
| summarize Count = count() by ExecutedProcessName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| top 1 by Count desc | |
| 2 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | crond | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(24h)
| where (tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) contains "cron" or tolower(FileName) contains "cron" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "cron")
| where not (tolower(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) contains "/usr/bin" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) contains "/usr/sbin" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) contains "/bin" or tolower(InitiatingProcessFolderPath) contains "/sbin")
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessMD5, InitiatingProcessSHA256 | |
| 3 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | "cmd.exe" /c netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) or isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend Cmd = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingProcessCommandLine), InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend CmdFile = iif(isnotempty(InitiatingProcessFileName), InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName)
| where tolower(Cmd) contains "netsh"
| where tolower(Cmd) contains "wlan" and (tolower(Cmd) contains "show profile" or tolower(Cmd) contains "show profiles")
| where tolower(Cmd) contains "key=clear"
| project TimeGenerated, Cmd, CmdFile, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessSessionId, ProcessCreationTime, DeviceName, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 4 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | __PSScriptPolicyTest_2jgba2ap.do1.ps1 | ✗ | DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType in ('Copied','Created','FileCreated','FileCopied')
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains 'System32' or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith '\\System32'
| where FolderPath contains 'Users'
| summarize MinTime = min(TimeGenerated) by CopiedExecutableName = FileName, SourceFolder = InitiatingProcessFolderPath, DestinationFolder = FolderPath
| order by MinTime asc
| take 1
| project MinTime, CopiedExecutableName, SourceFolder, DestinationFolder | |
| 5 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | "powershell.exe" & {copy-item -Path \"\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password\" -Destination \"$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password\"} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "powershell" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "pwsh"
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "copy-item"
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "c$"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountDomain, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 6 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | /tmp/T1003.007.bin | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "dd" and ProcessCommandLine has "/proc/" and ProcessCommandLine has "mem"
| extend OutputFile = tostring(extract(@"of=([^\s]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine))
| where isnotempty(OutputFile)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, OutputFile
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 7 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | let WindowsDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform contains "Windows"
| distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (WindowsDevices)
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName contains "cmdkey" or ProcessCommandLine contains "cmdkey" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "cmdkey")
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/list" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/list" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-list" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-list")
| extend FullCommand = coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, FullCommand, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain | |
| 8 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | sh -c "systemctl status himdsd 1>/dev/null 2>&1" | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) or isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend CmdLine = tostring(coalesce(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine))
| where CmdLine contains "systemctl" or CmdLine contains "service"
| where CmdLine contains "systemctl list-units" or CmdLine contains "systemctl list-unit-files" or CmdLine contains "systemctl list-units --type=service" or CmdLine contains "systemctl list-units -t service" or CmdLine contains "systemctl status" or CmdLine contains "systemctl list-unit-files" or CmdLine contains "service --status-all"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, CmdLine, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 9 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 10 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 11 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 12 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 13 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 14 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 15 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 16 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | Get-Process | ✓ | let psExes = dynamic(["powershell.exe","pwsh.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in (psExes)
| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "get-process"
| extend CmdletDetected = "Get-Process"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, CmdletDetected | |
| 17 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 18 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 19 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 21 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | "cmd.exe" /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | let TimeRange = 7d;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(TimeRange)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "cmd.exe"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "taskmgr"
| extend FullCommand = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName, FullCommand, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSessionId
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 22 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("schtasks.exe", "schtasks") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("schtasks.exe", "schtasks")
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/Create" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/Create")
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/SC ONLOGON" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/SC ONSTART" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/SC ONLOGON" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/SC ONSTART")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 23 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 24 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 25 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 26 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 27 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist.exe | ✓ | let cmdListEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) == "cmd.exe"
| where (tolower(FileName) contains "tasklist" or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "tasklist" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "tasklist")
| extend BuiltInTool = iif(tolower(FileName) contains "tasklist", "tasklist.exe", iif(tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "tasklist", "tasklist.exe", iif(tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "tasklist", "tasklist.exe", "Unknown")))
| where BuiltInTool != "Unknown"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, BuiltInTool
; cmdListEvents | |
| 28 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 29 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 30 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 31 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 32 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 33 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | Review recent Windows process event logs for PowerShell activity that suggests local group enumeration through WMI. What exact command was executed? | Get-WMIObject Win32_Group | "powershell.exe" & {Get-WMIObject Win32_Group} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("powershell","PowerShell","pwsh","Pwsh") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("powershell","PowerShell","pwsh","Pwsh")
| where (
(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject","gwmi","Get-CimInstance") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject","gwmi","Get-CimInstance"))
and
(
ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Win32_Group","Win32_GroupUser") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("Win32_Group","Win32_GroupUser")
)
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 35 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 36 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 37 | On a Linux system, you suspect someone erased their command history by linking the history file to /dev/null. Investigate process events and determine which utility was executed to achieve this. | ln | ln | ✓ | let StartTime = ago(7d);
let processHits = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= StartTime
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "ln" or ProcessCommandLine contains "ln"
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/dev/null" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/dev/null")
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains ".bash_history" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "bash_history" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "history")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessSessionId;
let fileHits = DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= StartTime
| where ActionType in ("Link","Create","Symlink","Relink","HardLink","SymbolicLink")
| where (FileName endswith ".bash_history" or FileName contains "bash_history")
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "ln" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/dev/null")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessId;
processHits
| union fileHits
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| take 250 | |
| 38 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 39 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 40 | On a Linux system, find any process creation record where awk is used with a BEGIN rule to launch a shell. What was the exact command invoked? | awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}’ | /bin/sh & | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFileName endswith "awk" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "awk")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "BEGIN"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "system("
| extend ShellArg = extract(@"system\(\s*([^\)]+)\s*\)", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ShellArg)
| where ShellArg contains "/bin/sh" or ShellArg contains "/bin/bash"
| join kind=inner (
DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform contains "Linux" or OSDistribution contains "Linux"
| project DeviceId, DeviceName, OSPlatform, OSDistribution
) on DeviceId
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ShellArg, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessId, OSPlatform, OSDistribution
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 41 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 42 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 43 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | usermod --expiredate 99999 art | ✗ | let linuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform contains "Linux"
| project DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (linuxDevices)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("chsh","usermod") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains " chsh" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "usermod"
| extend TargetUser = tostring(extract(@"(?:^|\s)([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_\-]+)$", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine))
| extend TargetShell = tostring(extract(@"-s\s+([^\s]+)", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine))
| where isnotempty(TargetUser) or isnotempty(TargetShell)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessId, TargetUser, TargetShell) by DeviceName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, TargetUser, TargetShell | |
| 44 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 45 | On a Linux endpoint, you suspect malicious clearing of the bash history by redirecting from the null device. Explore process or file events to uncover the exact shell command that performed this action. | cat /dev/null > ~/.bash_history | export HISTFILE="/dev/null" | ✗ | let tFrom = ago(1d);
let tTo = now();
let procHits = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (tFrom .. tTo)
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "bash" or ProcessCommandLine contains "bash")
| where (
InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "/dev/null" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/dev/null"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "> ~/.bash_history" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains ">/.bash_history"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "> ~/.bash_history" or ProcessCommandLine contains ">/.bash_history"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "cat /dev/null"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "truncate -s 0 ~/.bash_history"
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "history -c"
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessId, ProcessId;
let fileHits = DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (tFrom .. tTo)
| where (FolderPath contains ".bash_history" or FileName contains ".bash_history" or FileName contains "bash_history")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
procHits
| union fileHits
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| take 200 | |
| 46 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 47 | On a Windows endpoint, review process execution logs to see if any PowerShell sessions were wiped clean. Which command was executed to clear the PowerShell history? | Clear-History | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 48 | Review the Linux process creation records to find which user account management utility was used to reactivate the previously locked and expired account. | usermod | usermod | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ('usermod','passwd','chage')
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains 'usermod'
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains 'passwd'
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains 'chage'
| extend CmdLine = tostring(InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where CmdLine contains '-U' or CmdLine contains '--unlock' or CmdLine contains 'passwd -u' or CmdLine contains 'passwd --unlock' or CmdLine contains 'usermod -U' or CmdLine contains 'usermod --unlock'
| join kind=inner (DeviceInfo | where tolower(OSPlatform) contains 'linux') on DeviceId
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, CmdLine
| summarize LastActionTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Actor = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Utility = InitiatingProcessFileName, TargetAccount = AccountName
| sort by LastActionTime desc
| take 5
| project LastActionTime, Actor, Utility, TargetAccount | |
| 49 | Investigate Windows process execution logs for a PowerShell cmdlet used to list group members. Look for entries where a group name is provided after a '-Name' flag and identify which group was queried. | Administrators | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 50 | On a Windows endpoint, commands are no longer being logged to PowerShell history, suggesting PSReadLine settings were altered. Using process execution logs, determine the exact command that was run to set the history save style to 'SaveNothing'. | Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing | N/A | ✗ |
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