grok-3-mini-beta
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
58.5%
(110 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
2.53
per question
Avg. Execution Time
16.55s
Total Cost
$0.7454
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == 'cmdkey.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '/list'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName | |
| 2 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | /tmp/T1003.007.bin | ✓ | let LinuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (LinuxDevices)
| where FileName == "dd"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/proc/" and ProcessCommandLine contains "mem"
| extend OutputFile = extract(@"of=([^ ]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project Timestamp, ProcessCommandLine, OutputFile
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by OutputFile | |
| 3 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | svchost-exe.dmp | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'rundll32.exe'
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains 'comsvcs.dll' and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains 'MiniDump'
| where FolderPath contains 'Temp'
| project FileName
| distinct FileName | |
| 4 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | Format-Hex | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == 'powershell.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'PhysicalDrive' or ProcessCommandLine contains '\\.\\' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'boot sector'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| limit 100 | |
| 5 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | systemctl --type=service | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any('service', 'systemctl', 'list-units')
| join kind=inner (DeviceInfo | where OSPlatform == 'Linux' | project DeviceId) on DeviceId
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by ProcessCommandLine
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| take 100 | |
| 6 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 7 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | None | ✗ | let linuxDevices = DeviceInfo | where OSPlatform == "Linux" | distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (linuxDevices)
| where FileName =~ "ping"
| extend TargetIP = extract(@"\\b\\d{1,3}\\\.\\d{1,3}\\\.\\d{1,3}\\\.\\d{1,3}\\b", 0, ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, TargetIP, TimeGenerated) by DeviceId
| project DeviceId, TargetIP, TimeGenerated
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 8 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 9 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == 'netsh.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'wlan' and ProcessCommandLine contains 'show profile' and ProcessCommandLine contains 'key=clear'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| limit 100 | |
| 10 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | arp -a | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "arp -a"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 11 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | "cmd.exe" /c for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ 'cmd.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'ping' and ProcessCommandLine contains 'for'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| limit 10 | |
| 12 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | utilities | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "ss" and ProcessCommandLine contains "tcp" and not (ProcessCommandLine contains "lo")
| summarize utilities = make_set(FileName)
| project utilities | |
| 13 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 14 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Invoke-Expression" or ProcessCommandLine contains "IEX"
| distinct FileName | |
| 15 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 16 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName startswith 'powershell'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '-EncodedCommand'
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName | |
| 17 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | base64 | ✗ | DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == 'Linux'
| project DeviceId
| join kind=inner (DeviceProcessEvents) on DeviceId
| where ProcessCommandLine has 'base64' and (ProcessCommandLine has '-d' or ProcessCommandLine has 'decode')
| project FileName, DeviceId, ProcessCommandLine
| summarize Filename = make_set(FileName) by DeviceId // Summarizes to get unique filenames per device for clarity | |
| 18 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | set_Utilities | ✗ | DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == 'Linux'
| project DeviceId
| join kind=inner (
DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == 'FileModified'
| where FileSize == 1
| summarize Utilities = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName) by DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| project Utilities
| summarize make_set(Utilities) | |
| 19 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | cron | ✗ | let linuxDevices = DeviceInfo | where OSPlatform == "Linux" | distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName =~ "cron"
| where DeviceId in (linuxDevices)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, DeviceId, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 20 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | taskhostw.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath contains 'AppData' and not(FolderPath contains 'System32')
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName contains 'powershell'
| distinct FileName | |
| 21 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 22 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 23 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 24 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | python3 -m http.server 9090 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "python3" and ProcessCommandLine contains "9090"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| take 10 | |
| 25 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | scanning | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has 'nmap' or ProcessCommandLine has 'finger'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, FileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 26 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | netstat | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'netstat'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| limit 10 | |
| 27 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | rclone.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine has "ftp" or ProcessCommandLine has "21"
| distinct FileName | |
| 28 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | Get-NetTCPConnection | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ 'powershell.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'Get-NetTCPConnection' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'netstat'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 29 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 30 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | persistevil | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath has "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"
| where ActionType in~ ('FileCreated', 'FileModified')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ActionType
| summarize AddedFiles = make_set(FileName), LatestTime = arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by DeviceName, ActionType
| order by LatestTime desc | |
| 31 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 32 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName has "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("create", "at logon", "at startup")
| summarize count() by FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, count_ | |
| 33 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | powershell.exe, rundll32.exe | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == 'ProcessCreated'
| where FileName in~ ('rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'powershell.exe') and (ProcessCommandLine has 'dll' or ProcessCommandLine has 'http')
| project FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Timestamp
| summarize ExecutableUsed = arg_max(FileName, *) by FileName
| project ExecutableUsed | |
| 35 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | art-timer.timer | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "systemctl" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "start" or ProcessCommandLine contains "enable") and ProcessCommandLine contains ".timer"
| extend Action = extract(@"systemctl\s+(start|enable)\s+([^\s]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend TimerName = extract(@"systemctl\s+(start|enable)\s+([^\s]+)", 2, ProcessCommandLine)
| where Action in~ ("start", "enable")
| summarize Actions = make_set(Action), LatestTime = max(TimeGenerated) by TimerName, DeviceName
| where array_length(set_intersect(dynamic(["start", "enable"]), Actions)) == 2
| project DeviceName, TimerName, Actions, TimeGenerated = LatestTime
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 36 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | Get-Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'powershell.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'Get-Process'
| project ProcessCommandLine, Timestamp
| distinct ProcessCommandLine | |
| 37 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | lsass | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '| findstr'
| extend searchedFor = extract(@'findstr "(.*?)"', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, searchedFor
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 38 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | wmic | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has 'wmic process' or ProcessCommandLine has 'Get-WmiObject Win32_Process'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 39 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | "cmd.exe" /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ 'taskmgr.exe'
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'cmd.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ' '
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 40 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ 'cmd.exe'
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'tasklist' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'wmic process'
| extend Tool = extract(@'(\btasklist\b|\bwmic process\b)', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize DistinctTools = make_set(Tool) by TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName | |
| 41 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 42 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 43 | Which full interactive shell command, as recorded in the Linux process logs, repeatedly echoed a distinctive marker message to the terminal? | for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done | bash -c 'TEST=$(echo $HISTCONTROL); if [ "$HISTCONTROL" != "ignoreboth" ]; then export HISTCONTROL="ignoreboth"; fi; history -c ; ls -la $HISTFILE # " ls -la $HISTFILE"; if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 1 ]; then echo "ls -la is not in history cache"; fi; if [ "$HISTCONTROL" != "erasedups" ]; then export HISTCONTROL="erasedups"; fi; history -c ; ls -la $HISTFILE; ls -la $HISTFILE; ls -la $HISTFILE; if [ $(history |wc -l) -eq 2 ]; then echo "Their is only one entry for ls -la $HISTFILE"; fi' | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == 'ProcessCreated'
| where FileName in~ ('bash', 'sh')
| where ProcessCommandLine contains 'echo' and (ProcessCommandLine contains 'while' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'for')
| summarize RepeatedEchoCommands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceId
| project DeviceId, RepeatedEchoCommands
| limit 100 // Limit results for practicality; adjust as needed | |
| 44 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | perl | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath startswith "/"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("perl", "cpan", "cpanm")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/bin/sh", "system", "exec", "shell")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 45 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | cat /etc/shells | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '/etc/shells'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 46 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | chsh -s /bin/sh art | ✓ | let linuxDevices = DeviceInfo | where OSPlatform == 'Linux' | distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (linuxDevices)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "usermod -s" or ProcessCommandLine contains "chsh"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
| limit 100 // Limit results for practicality; adjust as needed | |
| 47 | On a Linux system, review process execution records for any shell process that set an environment variable containing executable code and then piped it into another shell instance. Determine which environment variable name was used to store the script content. | ART | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 48 | On a Linux system, find any process creation record where awk is used with a BEGIN rule to launch a shell. What was the exact command invoked? | awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}’ | awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}' | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| join kind=inner (DeviceInfo | where OSPlatform == "Linux" | project DeviceId, OSPlatform) on DeviceId
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "awk" and ProcessCommandLine contains "BEGIN" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "system" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/bin/sh")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 49 | During a Linux investigation, you notice processes spawning curl and wget commands that pull a script from a remote GitHub raw URL and pipe it into bash. Identify the name of the script that was retrieved and executed. | echo-art-fish.sh | pipe-to-shell.sh | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'\bcurl\b.*\|\b.*\bbash\b' or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @'\bwget\b.*\|\b.*\bbash\b'
| extend FullURL = extract(@'(https?://[^\s|]+)', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend arr = split(FullURL, '/')
| extend ScriptName = arr[array_length(arr) - 1]
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, ScriptName
| summarize ScriptNames = make_set(ScriptName) by DeviceName | |
| 50 | On a Linux system, analyze the process logs for suspicious command line activity that includes a sequence of commands indicating a pipe-to-shell operation. Identify the tool that was used to execute this piped command, paying special attention to its use in downloading and running script content. | bash | bash | ✓ | DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == 'Linux'
| join kind=inner (DeviceProcessEvents) on DeviceId
| where ProcessCommandLine contains '|' and (ProcessCommandLine contains 'curl' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'wget') and (ProcessCommandLine contains 'bash' or ProcessCommandLine contains 'sh')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by DeviceId, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc |
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