o1-high
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
63.3%
(119 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
2.71
per question
Avg. Execution Time
40.35s
Total Cost
$98.5025
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | svchost-exe.dmp | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FolderPath contains "Temp"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "rundll32.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "comsvcs.dll"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 2 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | Out-Minidump.ps1 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FileName == "powershell.exe" or InitiatingProcessFileName == "powershell.exe")
and (ProcessCommandLine has "lsass" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "lsass")
| extend InvokedScript = extract(@"([^\s]+\.ps1)",1,ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InvokedScript, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 3 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | /tmp/T1003.007.bin | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType in ("CreateProcess", "ProcessCreated")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
// Join with DeviceInfo to ensure we only look at Linux systems
| join kind=inner (
DeviceInfo
| project DeviceId, OSPlatform
) on DeviceId
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "dd "
and ProcessCommandLine has "if=/proc/"
and ProcessCommandLine has "/mem"
and ProcessCommandLine has " of="
| parse kind=regex ProcessCommandLine with * "if=" Source " of=" DumpFile " " *
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, Source, DumpFile
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 4 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | 8.8.8.8 | ✓ | let LinuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| distinct DeviceId;
LinuxDevices
| join (DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "ping" or ProcessCommandLine has "ping") on DeviceId
| extend TargetIp = extract("([0-9]+(?:\\.[0-9]+){3})", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, TargetIp
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 5 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "cmdkey.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/list"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountDomain, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 6 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | netsh_wlan_show_profile_*_key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName =~ "netsh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("wlan", "show", "profile", "key=clear")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 7 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | Test-NetConnection | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","powershell_ise.exe")
// Look for references to a port test in command line
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Test-NetConnection", "Test-Connection", "-TcpPort", "445")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 8 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | ip | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| join kind=inner (
DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
) on DeviceId
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("tcp", "cache")
| where not(ProcessCommandLine has_any ("lo", "loopback"))
| summarize Commands = makeset(ProcessCommandLine), Count=count() by FileName, DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| order by Count desc | |
| 9 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 10 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | arp -a | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType in~ ("ProcessCreated", "Create", "CreateProcess")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("arp", "-a")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 11 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 12 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | "cmd.exe" /c for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType =~ "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("ping", "for")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountDomain, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 13 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 14 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("iex", "FromBase64String", "System.Reflection")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 15 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc ", "-EncodedCommand")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 16 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 17 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | taskhostw.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName == "PowerShell.EXE"
| where FolderPath contains "AppData"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256 | |
| 18 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 19 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | sc.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName in~ ("sc.exe","reg.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wmic.exe","net.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("create", "config", "service", "binPath", "w32time")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 21 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | c:\T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has " /create " and ProcessCommandLine has "powershell"
| extend ScriptName = extract(@"([A-Za-z0-9\\/\-_.:]+\.ps1)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ScriptName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 22 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | crond | ✓ | DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| distinct DeviceId
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
// Catch partial matches on the name "cron"
| where FileName contains "cron"
// Exclude typical cron binaries/paths
| where FolderPath !startswith "/usr/bin"
and FolderPath !startswith "/usr/sbin"
and FolderPath !startswith "/bin"
and FolderPath !startswith "/sbin"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName,
ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
) on DeviceId
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName,
ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 23 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | powershell.exe & {copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password"} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Copy-Item", "copy")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "C$" and ProcessCommandLine has "temp"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountDomain, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 24 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 25 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | rclone.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ftp", "ftp://", "FtpWebRequest")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 26 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | NETSTAT.EXE | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where FileName =~ "netstat.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 27 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | python3 -m http.server 9090 | ✓ | DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| distinct DeviceId
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "python3"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "9090"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/tmp"
) on DeviceId
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 28 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | Get-NetTCPConnection | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" or FileName =~ "pwsh.exe" or FileName =~ "powershell_ise.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Get-NetTCPConnection"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 29 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | persistevil | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where FolderPath startswith "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName | |
| 30 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1053.005\src\T1053_005_WMI.xml | ✓ | // Investigate PowerShell activity leveraging WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "RegisterByXml"
| extend XmlFileName = extract(@"(?i)([A-Z]:\\[\w\\.\-]+\.xml)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, XmlFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 31 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 32 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType =~ "ProcessCreated" or ActionType =~ "CreateProcess"
| where FileName in~ ("schtasks.exe", "at.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/create", "/Create", "AtLogon", "OnStart")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 33 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 35 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | lsass | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("tasklist", "net", "wmic", "dir", "sc")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("| find", "| findstr")
| extend AttackerSearch = extract(@'\|(?:\s*)find(?:str)?\s+(?:"([^"]+)"|(\S+))', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, AttackerSearch
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 36 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | Get-Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-Process", "Get-WmiObject", "Get-CimInstance")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 37 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | cmd.exe /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where FileName =~ "taskmgr.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 38 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
// Filter to known built-in tools typically used to list running processes
| where FileName in~ ("tasklist.exe", "wmic.exe")
// Optionally refine to further confirm the process-listing context
// by inspecting the command line for relevant keywords (uncomment line below if needed)
// | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("list", "tasklist", "process")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 39 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | art-timer | ✗ | let LinuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (LinuxDevices)
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("systemctl enable", "systemctl start")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".timer"
| extend TimerName = extract(@"systemctl\s+(?:enable|start)\s+([^\s]+)\.timer", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(TimerName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, TimerName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 40 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | AtomicTask | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Register-ScheduledTask", "Set-ScheduledTask", "New-ScheduledTask")
| extend TaskNameQuoted = extract('-TaskName\\s+"([^"]+)"', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend TaskNameUnquoted = extract('-TaskName\\s+(\\S+)', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend ScheduledTaskName = coalesce(TaskNameQuoted, TaskNameUnquoted)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ScheduledTaskName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 41 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | cpan | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("perl", "cpan", "cpanm")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "zsh", "ksh", "dash")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 42 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 43 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | Win32_Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject", "gwmi", "Get-CimInstance")
| extend WmiClassName=extract(@"-Class\s+(\S+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, WmiClassName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 44 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | wmic | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType in~ ("CreateProcess", "ProcessCreated")
| where isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine)
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has_any ("wmic", "get-wmiobject", "get-ciminstance", "win32_process", "gwmi")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 45 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | chsh -s /bin/sh art | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (DeviceInfo | where OSPlatform == "Linux" | distinct DeviceId)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("chsh","usermod -s")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountDomain, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 46 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 47 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | cat | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| join kind=inner (
DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
) on DeviceId
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/shells"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 48 | Which full interactive shell command, as recorded in the Linux process logs, repeatedly echoed a distinctive marker message to the terminal? | for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 49 | Review recent Windows process event logs for PowerShell activity that suggests local group enumeration through WMI. What exact command was executed? | Get-WMIObject Win32_Group | "powershell.exe" & {Get-WMIObject Win32_Group} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject", "gwmi")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Win32_Group"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 50 | On a Linux system, review process execution records for any shell process that set an environment variable containing executable code and then piped it into another shell instance. Determine which environment variable name was used to store the script content. | ART | N/A | ✗ |
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