o3-mini-high
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
51.6%
(97 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
2.79
per question
Avg. Execution Time
21.35s
Total Cost
$4.9228
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | T1003.008.txt | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/etc/shadow" and ProcessCommandLine contains ">"
| extend output_file = extract(@">\s*(\S+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, output_file
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 2 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | union
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "cmdkey.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/list"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FullCommand = ProcessCommandLine),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "rundll32.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "keymgr.dll,KRShowKeyMgr"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FullCommand = ProcessCommandLine)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 3 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | T1003.007.bin | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "dd"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "if=/proc/" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "mem"
| extend dump_file = extract(@"of=(\S+)", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(dump_file)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, dump_file | |
| 4 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | Format-Hex | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "format-hex"
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) contains "\\.\\"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessId, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 5 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName has "netsh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "wlan show profile" and ProcessCommandLine contains "key=clear"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessCreationTime | |
| 6 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 7 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 8 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | 8.8.8.8 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "ping"
| extend targetIP = extract(@"\b(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|[01]?\d?\d)\.){3}(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4]\d|[01]?\d?\d)\b", 0, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(targetIP)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, targetIP
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 9 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | netstat | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "netstat" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains " ss "
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| distinct TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 10 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 11 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | "cmd.exe" /c for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "ping" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "for /l"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 12 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where strlen(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) > 200
| summarize Count = count() by ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName
| sort by Count desc | |
| 13 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | dash | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "-encodedcommand" or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "-enc"
| summarize Count = count() by InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Count desc | |
| 14 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 15 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | arp -a | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "arp -a"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 16 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 17 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 18 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | crond | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
// Look for processes with 'cron' in the name
| where FileName contains "cron"
// Exclude typical cron daemon location; adjust the path condition as needed
| where FolderPath !contains "/usr/sbin"
| extend ExecutablePath = strcat(FolderPath, "/", FileName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ExecutablePath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 19 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(FileName) == "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "powershell" and ProcessCommandLine has ".ps1"
| extend ScriptName = extract(@"(\S+\.ps1)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ScriptName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ScriptName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 21 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 22 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | svchost.exe | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where tolower(FolderPath) contains "appdata" and tolower(FolderPath) !contains "system32"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName) == "powershell.exe"
| where tolower(FileName) != "powershell.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName
| limit 50 | |
| 23 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 24 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | netstat | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
and ProcessCommandLine has "netstat"
| extend ToolExecuted = tostring(split(ProcessCommandLine, ' ')[0])
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, ToolExecuted
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 25 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 26 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 27 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 28 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | Get-NetTCPConnection | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) has "powershell"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) has "nettcpconnection"
| extend PS_Cmdlet = extract(@"(Get-[^\s]+)", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(PS_Cmdlet)
| summarize Count = count() by PS_Cmdlet
| order by Count desc | |
| 29 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "create"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 30 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | python3 -m http.server 9090 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| extend CMD = coalesce(ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| where CMD contains "python3"
and CMD contains "/tmp"
and CMD contains "9090"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, CMD
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 31 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | persistevil | ✓ | union isfuzzy=true DeviceFileEvents, DeviceEvents
| where FolderPath has "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileWrite", "FileWritten")
| project TimeGenerated, FileName, ActionType, FolderPath | |
| 32 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 33 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | lsass | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "tasklist" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "|"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("find", "findstr")
| extend SearchedProcess = extract(@"(?i)\|\s*(?:findstr|find)\s+(?:/i\s+)?([^\s]+)", 1, InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SearchedProcess
// Timerange will be set in function call. | |
| 35 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "tasklist"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine
| |
| 36 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 37 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | wmic | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where isnotempty(ProcessCommandLine) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "wmic" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "wmic")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessId, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 38 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | cmd.exe /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "taskmgr.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
// Optionally, if you know part of the unusual flag pattern, you can add a further filter like:
// | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-unusualFlag"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 39 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 40 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 41 | On a Linux system, review process execution records for any shell process that set an environment variable containing executable code and then piped it into another shell instance. Determine which environment variable name was used to store the script content. | ART | env_var | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "export" and ProcessCommandLine has "|"
| where FileName has_any ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "ksh")
| extend env_var = extract(@"export\s+([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(env_var)
| summarize count() by env_var, ProcessCommandLine
| project env_var | |
| 42 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 43 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 44 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | cat | ✓ | union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) has "/etc/shells"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, DeviceId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 45 | During a Linux investigation, you notice processes spawning curl and wget commands that pull a script from a remote GitHub raw URL and pipe it into bash. Identify the name of the script that was retrieved and executed. | echo-art-fish.sh | echo-art-fish.sh | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl", "wget")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "raw.githubusercontent.com"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "| bash"
| extend ScriptName = extract(@"https?://raw\.githubusercontent\.com/[^/]+/[^/]+/[^/]+/([^ \|]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ScriptName)
| summarize Occurrences = count() by ScriptName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Occurrences desc | |
| 46 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | chsh -s /bin/sh art | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "chsh" or ProcessCommandLine has "usermod -s"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 47 | On a Linux system, find any process creation record where awk is used with a BEGIN rule to launch a shell. What was the exact command invoked? | awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}’ | awk 'BEGIN {system("/bin/sh &")}' | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "awk" and ProcessCommandLine contains "BEGIN"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "/bin/sh" or ProcessCommandLine contains "sh -"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, ProcessId
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 48 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | dash | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) has_any ("cpan", "cpanm") or tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) has_any ("cpan", "cpanm"))
| where (tolower(FileName) has_any ("/bin/bash", "/bin/sh") or tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has_any ("/bin/bash", "/bin/sh", "bash", "sh"))
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessId, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 49 | On a Windows endpoint, wscript.exe was used to run a JScript. Identify the exact script path passed to wscript. | PathToAtomicsFolder\T1059.007\src\sys_info.js | C:\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1059.007\src\sys_info.js | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "wscript.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".js"
| extend ScriptPath = extract(@'([A-Za-z]:\\(?:[^\\/:*?"<>|\r\n]+\\)*[^\\/:*?"<>|\r\n]+\.js)', 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ScriptPath)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ScriptPath, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 50 | Investigate Windows process execution logs for a PowerShell cmdlet used to list group members. Look for entries where a group name is provided after a '-Name' flag and identify which group was queried. | Administrators | Administrators | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "powershell" and ProcessCommandLine has "-Name"
| extend GroupQueried = extract("-Name\\s+['\"']?([^ '\"']+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(GroupQueried)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, GroupQueried
| order by TimeGenerated desc |
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