o4-mini-high
KQL Benchmark Performance Analysis
Performance Overview
Success Rate
51.1%
(96 / 188 successful)
Average Attempts
3.26
per question
Avg. Execution Time
39.39s
Total Cost
$6.0534
Detailed Test Results
Showing 1 to 50 of 188 results
Page 1 of 4
| # | Prompt (Question) | MITRE ATT&CK | Correct Answer | LLM Answer | Correct | KQL Query from LLM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | On a Windows host, an attacker leveraged COMSVCS.DLL via rundll32.exe to dump the memory of svchost.exe into a file under the Temp directory. Review the file creation logs to determine the exact name of the dump file that was generated. | svchost-exe.dmp | svchost-exe.dmp | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
// Identify rundll32.exe loading COMSVCS.DLL
| where InitiatingProcessFileName == "rundll32.exe"
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessCommandLine) contains "comsvcs.dll"
// Focus on Temp folder
| where tolower(FolderPath) contains "\\temp\\"
// Look only for dump files
| where tolower(FileName) endswith ".dmp"
// Return relevant details
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| distinct FileName, FolderPath, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, TimeGenerated, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | |
| 2 | In a Linux environment, an elevated process was used to execute a command that read /etc/shadow and redirected its output to a file. Identify what file name was employed to store these results. | T1003.008.txt | /tmp/T1003.008.txt; | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
// Only processes run by root
| where AccountName == "root"
// Look for reading /etc/shadow and using shell redirection (> or >>)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/shadow" and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"\>{1,2}"
// Extract the path/file following the redirection operator
| extend OutputFile = extract(@"\>{1,2}\s*(\S+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(OutputFile)
// Show relevant fields
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, OutputFile
// Summarize to see unique files and their timelines
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), Occurrences = count() by OutputFile, DeviceName, AccountName
| order by LastSeen desc | |
| 3 | On Windows devices, identify the full command used when the built-in credential manager utility was invoked to list stored credentials. What was the exact command? | cmdkey /list | cmdkey.exe /list | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_cs "cmdkey" and ProcessCommandLine has_cs "/list"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| distinct TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 4 | On a Linux host, a ping command was executed to test internet connectivity. Determine which IP address was used as the ping target. | 8.8.8.8 | 8.8.8.8 | ✓ | // Identify Linux devices
let linuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform contains "Linux"
| project DeviceId, DeviceName;
// Network-based ping events (ICMP by ping)
let pingNetwork = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where DeviceId in (linuxDevices | project DeviceId)
| where Protocol == "ICMP"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("ping", "ping6")
| extend ProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, PingTarget = RemoteIP, ProcessCommandLine;
// Process-based ping events (extract IP from command line)
let pingProcess = DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (linuxDevices | project DeviceId)
| where FileName in ("ping", "ping6")
| extend PingTarget = extract(@"(\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, PingTarget, ProcessCommandLine;
// Combine, enrich, filter, and sort
union pingNetwork, pingProcess
| where isnotempty(PingTarget)
| join kind=inner linuxDevices on DeviceId
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, PingTarget, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 5 | On a Windows host, someone appears to have run a built-in network shell utility to list saved wireless network profiles and their passwords in clear text. Review the process creation logs to discover the exact command that was executed. | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | netsh wlan show profile * key=clear | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "netsh.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "wlan" and ProcessCommandLine has "show" and ProcessCommandLine has "profile"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "key=clear"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessId, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 6 | On a Linux system, review process creation logs to spot any dd commands reading from /proc/*/mem. What was the name of the file where the dumped memory was written? | T1003.007.bin | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 7 | An analyst suspects a user or script ran a service enumeration command on a Linux system. Review process events to find the service-listing invocation and specify the full command that was executed. | systemctl --type=service | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 8 | Identify the PowerShell cmdlet used on Windows to format and display the raw volume bytes after an attacker read the boot sector via a DOS device path. | Format-Hex | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 9 | An analyst notices a PowerShell process on a Windows host that appears to be checking SMB connectivity. Which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to perform this outbound port 445 test? | Test-NetConnection | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 10 | Using Windows process event logs, investigate PowerShell activity around lsass.exe memory capture. What was the name of the script file invoked to perform the dump? | Out-Minidump.ps1 | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 11 | A Linux host’s Syslog shows a shell-based network discovery script ran multiple commands. One of them listed current TCP connections. Which utility was invoked? | netstat | sh | ✗ | DeviceInfo
| where OSPlatform == "Linux"
| project DeviceId, DeviceName
| join kind=inner (
DeviceProcessEvents
// look for commands referencing TCP connections
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "tcp"
// common utilities for listing TCP connections
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "netstat" or ProcessCommandLine contains "ss" or ProcessCommandLine contains "lsof"
) on DeviceId
| extend Utility = tostring(split(ProcessCommandLine, ' ')[0])
| summarize Invocations = count() by DeviceName, Utility
| project DeviceName, Utility, Invocations
| sort by Invocations desc | |
| 12 | Review Linux process execution records for any commands that list TCP metric cache entries and filter out loopback interfaces. Which utility was used? | ip | ip | ✓ | let LinuxDevices = DeviceInfo
| where tolower(OSPlatform) contains "linux"
| distinct DeviceId;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where DeviceId in (LinuxDevices)
// Filter for any tcp_metrics invocation
and ProcessCommandLine has "tcp_metrics"
// Exclude loopback traffic entries
and ProcessCommandLine !has " lo"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| summarize Invocations = count() by FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Invocations desc | |
| 13 | A Windows host executed an ICMP-based network reconnaissance using a looping instruction in cmd.exe. Identify the exact command line that was used to perform the ping sweep. | for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | "cmd.exe" /c for /l %i in (1,1,254) do ping -n 1 -w 100 192.168.1.%i | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
// Apply your time range filter here (e.g. | where TimeGenerated between (start .. end))
| where FileName == "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)for\s+/?l.*ping"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 14 | On a Windows endpoint, look for evidence of a base64-encoded PowerShell payload execution. Which executable launched the encoded command? | powershell.exe | powershell.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
// Match –EncodedCommand or –enc followed by a Base64‐style string
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) matches regex @"-enc(odedcommand)?\s+[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{20,}"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc | |
| 15 | On a Windows endpoint, review process creation logs to uncover when a built-in utility was used to reveal ARP entries. What exact command was used to list the ARP cache? | arp -a | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 16 | On a Linux system, spotting a file‐size change by exactly one byte can indicate hash tampering via padding. Review process execution logs for invocations that increased a file’s size by one byte. Which utility was invoked to perform this padding? | truncate | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 17 | A Windows host shows a process launch with an extremely obfuscated command line that dynamically builds and invokes code at runtime. Which process name was used to execute this payload? | powershell | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 18 | On Windows hosts, look through recent PowerShell execution records to find any elevated session where remote management was turned on. What exact command was run to enable PSRemoting? | Enable-PSRemoting -Force | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 19 | On a Linux system, identify the script that was generated by decoding a base64 data file and then executed. What was the filename of that script? | art.sh | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 20 | On a Windows system, someone ran PowerShell to copy a file from a remote machine’s C$ share to the local TEMP folder. Using process event logs, what full PowerShell command was executed to perform this action? | copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password" | "powershell.exe" & {copy-item -Path "\\127.0.0.1\C$\Windows\temp\Easter_Bunny.password" -Destination "$Env:TEMP\Easter_egg.password"} | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Copy-Item"
and ProcessCommandLine contains "\\C$"
and ProcessCommandLine contains "Temp"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc | |
| 21 | A Linux host briefly hosted an HTTP service under /tmp. Examine process creation logs to determine the exact python3 command that was used to start the server on port 9090. | python3 -m http.server 9090 | python3 -m http.server 9090 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "python3" and ProcessCommandLine has "9090" and ProcessCommandLine has "/tmp"
| project ProcessCreationTime, DeviceName, ProcessId, ProcessCommandLine
| order by ProcessCreationTime desc | |
| 22 | In a Linux environment, you observe a process labeled like the cron daemon but running from an unexpected path. Investigate creation events to uncover the actual filename used by this fake cron process. | crond | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 23 | A process is running under a familiar Windows host name but originates from a user's AppData folder rather than the System32 directory. Identify the filename used to masquerade the PowerShell binary on this Windows device. | taskhostw.exe | taskhostw.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
// Processes launched from a user AppData folder (not the system path)
| where FolderPath has "\\Users\\" and FolderPath has "\\AppData\\" and not(FolderPath has "\\Windows\\System32\\")
// Identify entries where the original file name is PowerShell but the actual file name differs
| where tolower(ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName) == "powershell.exe" and tolower(FileName) != "powershell.exe"
// Aggregate by the masquerade filename
| summarize Occurrences = count() by MasqueradeFile = FileName
| sort by Occurrences desc | |
| 24 | Analyze Windows process events for any schtasks.exe commands that created a new task invoking PowerShell. What is the name of the .ps1 script specified to run? | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | T1036.004_NonExistingScript.ps1 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "schtasks.exe"
and ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
and ProcessCommandLine contains "-file"
and ProcessCommandLine contains ".ps1"
| extend ScriptName = extract(@"(?i)-file\s+""?([^""\s]+\.ps1)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(ScriptName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, ScriptName
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 25 | On a Windows endpoint you observe a PowerShell process that fetches a script from the internet and immediately executes an RPC service scan against the spooler. Which function name was invoked to perform that scan? | spoolvulnscan | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 26 | A threat actor on a Windows system crafted and registered a service named almost identically to the standard time service, but redirecting execution to a custom script. Review the logging data to determine which native command-line tool was used to perform this action. What utility was invoked? | sc | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 27 | Windows process creation logs show a PowerShell-driven file transfer to an FTP service. Which executable was leveraged to perform this exfiltration? | rclone.exe | rclone.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "ftp"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ExfiltrationProcess = FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| summarize Count = count() by ExfiltrationProcess, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Count desc | |
| 28 | In a Windows log analytics workspace, search for PowerShell processes that were used to enumerate network connections. Determine which PowerShell cmdlet was executed to list active TCP connections. | Get-NetTCPConnection | Get-NetTCPConnection | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-NetTCPConnection"
| extend Cmdlet = extract(@"(Get-NetTCPConnection)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| summarize Count = count() by Cmdlet
| order by Count desc | |
| 29 | Linux hosts may log events when new files are added to /var/spool/cron/crontabs. Query those logs for a creation or write action in that directory and determine the file name that was added. | persistevil | persistevil | ✓ | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath has "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileWritten", "FileModified", "FileOpenedWrite")
| summarize FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated), EventCount = count() by FileName
| sort by LastSeen desc | |
| 30 | A Windows host shows a core command-line utility being duplicated from its System32 location to a user-profile folder and subsequently run. Identify the name of the executable that was copied. | cmd.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 31 | You suspect malicious persistence via scheduled tasks on a Windows endpoint. Review the process execution logs to identify the built-in utility used to register tasks at logon or startup. What is the name of this utility? | schtasks | schtasks | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (startofday(ago(30d)) .. now()) // replace with desired timerange
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| summarize count() by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by count_ desc | |
| 32 | A user launched a Windows command prompt and executed a built-in utility to enumerate all active network connections. Using process creation logs, identify the exact tool that produced the list of current connections. | netstat | netstat.exe | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName) == "cmd.exe"
| where tolower(FileName) == "netstat.exe"
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("netstat", "Get-NetTCPConnection")
| project TimeGenerated,
DeviceName,
AccountName,
InitiatingProcessFileName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
ChildProcessFileName = FileName,
ChildProcessCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 33 | A reconnaissance tool was executed on a Windows system. Identify the specific function of the tool that was executed. The function has a name from something you can eat | fruit | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 34 | On a Windows device, PowerShell was used to collect a snapshot of running processes. Identify the exact cmdlet that was executed. | Get-Process | Get-Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-Process"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-WmiObject"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-CimInstance"
or ProcessCommandLine contains "tasklist"
| extend Cmdlet = extract(@"(?i)\b(Get-(?:Process|WmiObject|CimInstance))\b", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Cmdlet, ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 35 | A malicious actor may attempt to list running processes on a Windows machine using a WMI-based command. Review the process creation events to find out which utility was invoked to perform this enumeration. | wmic.exe | wmic | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
and (
ProcessCommandLine has_cs "wmic"
or ProcessCommandLine has_cs "Get-WmiObject"
or ProcessCommandLine has_cs "gwmi"
)
| project TimeGenerated,
DeviceName,
AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName,
ParentProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName,
ParentCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
ProcessFileName = FileName,
ProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 36 | A Windows endpoint recorded a command-line activity through cmd.exe that lists all running processes. Determine which built-in tool was executed to perform this action. | tasklist | tasklist | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName == "cmd.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("tasklist","wmic","powershell","Get-Process")
| extend Tool = case(
ProcessCommandLine contains "tasklist", "tasklist",
ProcessCommandLine contains "wmic", "wmic",
ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-Process", "Get-Process",
ProcessCommandLine contains "powershell", "PowerShell",
"Unknown")
| where Tool != "Unknown"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ProcessCommandLine, Tool
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, Tool
| order by Count desc | |
| 37 | On a Windows device, review the process execution logs to find instances where a built-in listing tool was piped into a string filter. Identify the process name that the attacker was searching for. | lsass | lsass | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
// Look for any command line containing a pipe
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "|"
// Ensure a built-in listing tool is used before the pipe
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "(?i)\\b(?:dir|ls|Get-ChildItem|tasklist|wmic)\\b\\s*\\|"
// Ensure a string filter is called after the pipe
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "(?i)\\|\\s*(?:findstr|grep)\\b"
// Extract the term passed to findstr or grep (first non-quoted token)
| extend SearchedTerm = extract("(?i)(?:findstr|grep)\\s+['\\\"]?([^'\\\"]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(SearchedTerm)
// Summarize by the searched term, showing count and example devices/accounts
| summarize EventCount = count(), AffectedDevices = make_set(DeviceName, 10), AffectedUsers = make_set(InitiatingProcessAccountName, 10) by SearchedTerm
| project SearchedTerm, EventCount, AffectedDevices, AffectedUsers
| order by EventCount desc | |
| 38 | Examine the logs from the Linux system for events related to the systemd timer activation. Identify any records indicating that a new timer unit was started and enabled, and determine which timer name was used. | art-timer.timer | art-timer.timer | ✓ | let SyslogTimers = DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "Syslog"
| extend SyslogMessage = tostring(AdditionalFields['SyslogMessage']), SyslogTag = tostring(AdditionalFields['SyslogTag'])
| where SyslogTag == "systemd" and SyslogMessage contains ".timer"
| extend Action = extract(@"systemd\[\d+\]:\s+(Started|Loaded|Enabled)", 1, SyslogMessage),
TimerName = extract(@"systemd\[\d+\]:\s+(?:Started|Loaded|Enabled)\s+([^\s]+\.timer)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where isnotempty(Action) and isnotempty(TimerName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, EventType = "Syslog", Action, TimerName;
let ProcTimers = DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has "systemctl" and ProcessCommandLine has ".timer"
| extend Action = extract(@"systemctl\s+(start|enable)", 1, ProcessCommandLine),
TimerName = extract(@"systemctl\s+(?:start|enable)\s+([^\s]+\.timer)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(Action) and isnotempty(TimerName)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, EventType = "Process", Action, TimerName;
union SyslogTimers, ProcTimers
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 39 | On Windows, review recent registry changes to detect when the MSC file association was hijacked by a reg add operation. What executable file was configured as the default command under HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command? | calc.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 40 | On a Windows host, investigate process events to find when Task Manager was launched via cmd with an unusual flag. What was the full command executed? | taskmgr.exe /7 | "cmd.exe" /c taskmgr.exe /7 | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ActionType == "ProcessCreated"
| where tolower(FileName) endswith "cmd.exe"
| where tolower(ProcessCommandLine) has "taskmgr.exe"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine | |
| 41 | Review the process creation logs on a Windows host to uncover any tool execution indicative of a special APC injection for shellcode execution. What was the name of the executable used? | NtQueueApcThreadEx.exe | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 42 | While reviewing Windows process events, you spot a PowerShell process executing a WMI enumeration cmdlet. What WMI class name did the attacker query? | Win32_Process | Win32_Process | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName has_cs "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Get-WmiObject", "Get-CimInstance", "gwmi")
| extend WmiClass1 = extract("(?i)-Class\\s+['\\\"]?(Win32_[^\\s'\\\"]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend WmiClass2 = extract("(?i)FROM\\s+(Win32_[^\\s'\\\";,]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| extend WmiClass = coalesce(WmiClass1, WmiClass2)
| where isnotempty(WmiClass)
| summarize EventCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by WmiClass
| project WmiClass, EventCount, FirstSeen, LastSeen
| order by EventCount desc | |
| 43 | On a Linux system, review process execution records for any shell process that set an environment variable containing executable code and then piped it into another shell instance. Determine which environment variable name was used to store the script content. | ART | EnvVariable | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in ("bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?<varName>[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=.*\|\s*(bash|sh|zsh|dash)"
| extend EnvVariable = extract(@"([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessId, FileName, EnvVariable, ProcessCommandLine
| distinct EnvVariable | |
| 44 | On a Windows host, find any scheduled task that was registered using PowerShell native cmdlets instead of schtasks.exe. What was the name given to the new task? | AtomicTask | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 45 | Investigate Windows process events for PowerShell activity that leverages WMI to register a scheduled task via XML import. What was the name of the XML file supplied to the RegisterByXml method? | T1053_005_WMI.xml | N/A | ✗ | ||
| 46 | During a Linux investigation, you notice processes spawning curl and wget commands that pull a script from a remote GitHub raw URL and pipe it into bash. Identify the name of the script that was retrieved and executed. | echo-art-fish.sh | echo-art-fish.sh | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (startofday(ago(7d)) .. now()) // timerange will be set by the external control
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl", "wget")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "raw.githubusercontent.com"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "bash" or ProcessCommandLine contains "|"
// Extract the raw.githubusercontent.com URL
| extend DownloadUrl = extract(@"(https?://raw\.githubusercontent\.com/[^\s|]+)", 1, ProcessCommandLine)
| where isnotempty(DownloadUrl)
// Parse out the script name (last segment of the URL)
| extend ScriptName = tostring(split(DownloadUrl, "/")[array_length(split(DownloadUrl, "/")) - 1])
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, DownloadUrl, ScriptName
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 47 | An attacker on a Linux host may try to enumerate installed shells by reading the system file that lists valid shells. Using process or syslog data, determine which command was executed to perform this enumeration. | cat /etc/shells | cat /etc/shells | ✓ | let ShellProcessEvents = DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"\b(cat|grep|awk|sed|less|more|tail|head)\b.*\/etc\/shells"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, CommandLine=ProcessCommandLine;
// If syslog data is available, look for raw slash etc shells reads in logs
let ShellSyslogEvents = Syslog
| where SyslogMessage has "/etc/shells"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName=HostName, AccountName="(unknown)", CommandLine=SyslogMessage;
// Combine both sources for a full view
ShellProcessEvents
| union ShellSyslogEvents
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 48 | On a Linux host, identify the process invocation that altered a user’s login shell. What was the full command used? | chsh -s /bin/sh art | chsh -s /bin/sh art | ✓ | DeviceProcessEvents
// limit to typical shell‐change commands
| where ProcessCommandLine has "chsh -s" or ProcessCommandLine has "usermod -s"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, ChangedByProcess = FileName, FullCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
| sort by TimeGenerated desc | |
| 49 | Which full interactive shell command, as recorded in the Linux process logs, repeatedly echoed a distinctive marker message to the terminal? | for i in $(seq 1 5); do echo "$i, Atomic Red Team was here!"; sleep 1; done | bash -c 'mkdir -p ********** for file in /var/spool/mail/*; do if [ "$(basename "$file")" != "copy" ]; then cp -R "$file" /var/spool/mail/copy/; if [ -f "/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename "$file")" ]; then echo "Modification for Atomic Red Test" >> "/var/spool/mail/copy/$(basename "$file")"; fi; fi; done' | ✗ | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "zsh")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "echo"
| summarize EchoCount = count() by FullCommand = ProcessCommandLine
| where EchoCount > 1
| sort by EchoCount desc
| project FullCommand, EchoCount | |
| 50 | An analyst suspects that a restricted shell escape was executed using a common Perl package manager on Linux. Review the process execution records to determine which tool was invoked to spawn the shell. | cpan | N/A | ✗ |
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